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LEVI STRA USS & CO. V. BLUE BELL, INC.:
LIMITING THE PROTECTION OF INHERENTLY
NONDISTINCTIVE TRADEMARKS
The Lanham Trademark Act of 19461 provides protection for any word,
name, symbol, or device used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify
his goods and to distinguish them from goods manufactured and sold by
others.2 Registration of a trademark is prima facie evidence of the registrant's
exclusive right to use that mark in commerce.3 Thus, the owner of a registered
trademark may enjoin other producers from using a deceptively similar mark
on any goods where such use is likely to cause confusion.4 The Act protects
the trademark owner from use of its trademark not only by competing
goods, but also by noncompeting goods.'
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1946).
2. Lanham Trademark Act §§ 1-45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946). See 3 R. CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 65 (3d ed. 1969).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1057 (1946).
4. The Trademark Act of 1905 (33 Stat. 724) provided that a right of action to suppress
an infringement of a registered trademark arose only if the infringement was used on "goods
of the same descriptive properties" as those set forth in registration. However, the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946 made clear that infringement could be found even though the registered
mark was used upon goods having different descriptive properties than those set forth in
registration, and even though there was no actual competition between the parties. See Fleisch-
man Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 830 (1963). See also Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1962) (protection
given trademark owner is not limited to goods upon which it is or has been used, "but extends
to product which would be reasonably thought by the buying public to come from the same
source if sold under the same mark").
The Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides in part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant:
a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . shall be liable in
a civil action by the registrant ....
5. See infra note 104; see also Professional Golfers Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 514 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1975) ("direct competition is not the sine qua non
of trademark infringement"); Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92
Cal. Rptr. 228 (2d Dist. 1971) (California Court of Appeals stated: "Although the appellation
'unfair competition' is still used to denominate the equitable doctrine and rules operative in
the field of disputes over tradenames, direct competition between the parties is not a prerequisite
to relief. Emphasis is now placed upon the word 'unfair' rather than upon 'competition.' ");
First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Wichman, 85 Wis. 2d 54, 67, 270 N.W.2d 168, 174
(1978) ("confusion as to sponsorship does not require competition").
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The "likelihood of confusion" issue is central to trademark infringement
actions. 6 It involves both the public's right to be free from confusion
concerning the manufacturer of a particular good, and the producer's right
to benefit from the goodwill and reputation it has earned through its
products. 7 The circuits are split on whether to review the likelihood of
confusion issue as a question of fact or question of law.' The Ninth Circuit
determined in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc.,9 (Blue Bell II), that the
likelihood of confusion was a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).10 Several
other federal circuits have followed the Ninth Circuit's view in theory. Yet,
the standard of review that courts actually apply is not always consistent
with the standard mandated by Federal Rule 52(a)." Instead, the appellate
courts may find either that a unique factual situation requires an exception
to the rule or that the rule is simply inapplicable to the particular issues at
hand. 12 Consequently, uncertainty remains regarding the standard of review
applicable to the likelihood of confusion issue despite some attempts to
reach uniformity. 3
This Note examines the various approaches taken by the circuits in re-
viewing the trial court's likelihood of confusion findings. Next, it considers
the limited guidance provided in this area by the United States Supreme
6. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1, at 44 (2d ed. 1984)
(while issues of priority, secondary meaning, assignment, and the like, may be present in some
cases, the likelihood of confusion test is the touchstone of trademark infringement as well as
unfair competition); see also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Props., Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 497
(2d Cir. 1962) (keystone in that portion of unfair competition law that relates to trademark
is avoidance of confusion in minds of buying public); Charcoal Steak House, Inc. v.
Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 139 S.E.2d 185 (1964) ("unfair competition is the child of confusion").
7. See James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.
1976) (what is at stake is the public's right to be free from confusion and the concomitant right
of a trademark owner to control his product's reputation); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Staley
Milling Co., 253 F.2d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1958) (social values that influence trademark law
include the public's ability to know that it will get the products it asks for and the protection
of the trademark owner's investment from misappropriation by pirates).
8. See Comment, Appellate Review of Lanham Act Violations: Is Likelihood of Confusion
A Question of Law or Fact, 38 Sw. L.J. 743 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Appellate Review].
9. 778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), aff'g, 208 U.S.P.Q. 473 (N.D. Cal. 1980),
reh'g, 732 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in pertinent part: "Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Cwy. P. 52(a).
11. The Fourth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits view the issue as a question of fact reviewable
under the clearly erroneous standard. However, the Seventh, Fifth and Second Circuits apply
the clearly erroneous standard to the issue of likelihood of confusion only in certain cases. See
infra note 41.
12. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
13. The Ninth Circuit in Blue Bell II adopted the clearly erroneous standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), "for the sake of accuracy, uniformity, and consistency with the
predominant view among the circuits." 778 F.2d at 1356.
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Court. Finally, it examines the Ninth Circuit's approach to the likelihood
of confusion issue in Blue Bell II, the advantages and disadvantages of a
strict factual analysis, and how such an analysis could ultimately resolve the
question of fact versus question of law dilemma.
I. BACKGROUND
In trademark infringement actions, a plaintiff must establish two elements
to receive injunctive relief. First, the plaintiff must show that its trademark
is either inherently distinctive or has become distinctive of its products.
Second, the plaintiff must show that the use of its mark on the infringer's
products is likely to cause confusion as to the source of that product. When
the plaintiff's and defendant's products are in direct competition, confusion
may result from the similarity of their trademarks.' 4 However, when the
parties are not in direct competition, confusion usually results from the
"re)fatedness" of the goods. 5
A. Secondary Meaning
The "strength" of a trademark generally refers to its tendency to identify
the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular source. The
strength of the mark, therefore, determines whether the mark deserves
trademark protection, and the parameters of that protection. 16 A trademark's
strength is generally defined 7 as either generic,' 8 descriptive, 9 suggestive, 20
14. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) ("when the
goods produced by the alleged infringer compete for sales with those of the trademark owner,
infringement usually will be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confusion can be
expected").
15. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 182 ("It is only when the products are not in
competition that one need call upon the related goods analysis to determine the existence of
infringement.").
16. See R. CAL mAN, supra note 2, § 20:43, at 261 (the distinctiveness and popularity of a
trademark determines its relative strength or weakness, and the latter will, in turn, define the
scope of protection to be accorded the mark against others that are confusingly similar); see
also McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979) (the strength
or distinctiveness of a mark determines both the ease with which it may be established as a
valid trademark and the degree of protection it will be accorded).
17. A trademark, however, may shift categories depending upon the product to which it is
affixed. For example, in Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555,
559 (S.D. N.Y. 1978), the court held that the term "polo" was generic to polo shirts and coats,
descriptive as to other shirts and coats and fanciful as it is applied to other articles of wearing
apparel.
18. See R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 12:2 (to determine whether a term is generic, the
standard is usually whether the primary significance of the mark in the minds of the consuming
public is the product or the producer; see also Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, 684 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (trademark is generic when trademark holder's
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or fanciful.21 A generic term or symbol cannot be registered as a valid
trademark because it can never indicate a particular source. 22 A descriptive
term or symbol is not inherently distinctive, yet it may receive federal
trademark protection if it has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce by acquiring a secondary meaning. 23 In the case of a suggestive
or fanciful mark, courts assume that the mark and the source are connected
because of the very nature of the mark. Therefore, the mark receives
trademark protection even without proof of secondary meaning. 24
goods themselves, rather than producer of such goods, motivate buyer to purchase them).
19. See Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 n.8 (1st Cir. 1980) (de-
scriptive term "merely describes a characteristic or ingredient of the article to which it refers
and can become a valid trademark only if consumers come to associate the term with a particular
producer's goods"). Courts sometimes categorize descriptive marks as either "merely descrip-
tive" or "commonly descriptive", the latter being identical to a generic term with respect to
the protection it is entitled. See Anti-Monopoly Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 684 F.2d
1316 (9th Cir. 1982) (term monopoly was "generic" because it was common term describing
purpose of game). A merely descriptive mark, therefore, may retain validity as a trademark
if it has acquired secondary meaning, but a common descriptive name may never acquire statutory
protection.
20. A suggestive term differs from a descriptive term in that the suggestive term requires
an added degree of inventiveness or imagination to associate a description of the product with
the term. "Thus while a descriptive term directly and clearly conveys information about the
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the product or service, the 'suggestive' term only
indirectly suggests these things." 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 11:21, at 491. See also
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (suggestive
term requires observer or listener to use imagination and perception to determine nature
of goods).
21. A fanciful term bears no logical or suggestive relation to the actual characteristics of
the goods. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir.
1976); see also 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 6, § 11:2, at 436 (fanciful mark may be distinguished
from an arbitrary mark in that the former mark is coined for the express purpose of functioning
as a trademark, whereas the latter is arbitrarily applied to the goods in question).
22. Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981) (a generic
term, being one which is commonly used as the name or description of a kind of goods, can
never acquire a secondary meaning). In Miller Brewing, the court reasoned that to allow
trademark protection for generic terms, even when these have been identified with a first user,
"would be to grant the owner of the mark a monopoly since a competitor could not describe
his goods as what they are." Id. at 8 (quoting CES Publishing Corp. v. St Regis Publications,
Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975)).
23. See Keebler Co, v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980).
24. Suggestive and fanciful marks are by nature inherently distinctive. Thus, such terms
need no proof of secondary meaning to prove "distinctiveness". But see 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra
note 6, § 11:33, at 438-39. McCarthy states that fanciful marks are not always exempt from
secondary meaning requirements. "There is a legal danger inherent in the use of a fanciful
mark, if used on a new and unfamiliar product. The danger is that buyers will take the mark
and use it as the generic name of the new product itself. Thus such fanciful marks as AsPHUN,
CELLOPHANE AND ESCALATOR have entered the public domain as generic designations for
products." Id.
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Secondary meaning inheres in a trademark when the mark identifies the
producer's goods and distinguishes them from other goods and producers.
The primary element of secondary meaning is a mental association in the
minds of consumers between a trademark and a single source of a product. 25
Therefore, a mark that is not inherently distinctive may acquire secondary
meaning and become distinctive of one producer. In determining whether a
mark has acquired secondary meaning, courts generally consider the extent
of the use, advertising, and promotion of the mark in conjunction with the
producer's goods.26 If the mark is a label or symbol as opposed to a name
or term, courts usually require proof of the additional factor of "nonfunc-
tionality" before awarding trademark protection. 27
B. Likelihood of Confusion and the Related Goods Test
If a manufacturer or producer registers a trademark distinctive of its goods
in commerce, it may protect its reputation and goodwill by precluding others
25. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1970). In
Carter-Wallace, the Ninth Circuit stated that "the chief inquiry" in the secondary meaning test "is
directed towards the consumer's attitude about the mark in question: does it denote to him a
single thing coming from a single source?" Id. at 802 (citing Aloe Cream Labs., Inc. v. Milsan,
Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849-50 (5th Cir. 1970)). See also Kellogg Co. V. National Biscuit Co. 305
U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (plaintiff must "show that the primary significance of the term in the
minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer"); Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1980) (secondary meaning is a "mental recognition"
that products marked with the same symbol emanate from or are associated with the same
source).
26. The factors courts traditionally consider in determining whether a mark has acquired
secondary meaning are the following: 1) the length and manner of use; 2) the nature and extent
of advertising and promotion of the mark; and 3) the efforts made in the direction of promoting
a conscious connection in the minds of the consuming public between the name or mark and
a particular product or venture. R. CALLMANN, supra note 6, § 77.3, at 349. But see Carter-
Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1970) (Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that evidence of advertising expenditures, though a factor to be considered, is
not dispositive of secondary meaning). The court instead focused on "the effectiveness of the
effort to create it and the chief inquiry is directed towards the consumer's attitude about the
mark in question: does it denote to him a single thing coming from a single source?" Id. at
802 (emphasis added).
27. A label or symbol attached to a product may be part of a product's trade-dress and
thus may serve a "functional" purpose if it is "an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product." Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
But see Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the Pagliero definition is applicable to those designs adopted solely for their aesthetic
appeal, and inapplicable to designs adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the source of the
plaintiff's product); see also Comment, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress
Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 77, 77-90 (1982)
(suggesting that the primary focus in trade-dress infringement cases should be the likelihood of
source confusion by reason of the challenged imitation and that functionality has no bearing
on whether source confusion is likely, thus it should be considered only in the context of the
scope of injunctive relief).
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from using a similar mark in conjunction with their goods in commerce.
The crucial issue in such cases is whether an appreciable number of ordinary
prudent purchasers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods
in question." Thus, trademark protection may extend to noncompeting goods
if the use of the similar mark is likely to cause confusion under this objective
test. 29 Confusion typically results from the use of similar marks on noncom-
peting goods only if the goods are somehow related.30 The degree of relat-
edness of noncompeting goods usually depends on whether the goods are
distributed in the same channels of trade, 3' or whether the goods are "com-
plimentary" in the sense that they may be used together.12
The Trademark Act of 190533 extended trademark protection only to goods
having the "same descriptive properties as those set forth in registration."
In Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson,34 however, the Second Circuit found a
likelihood of confusion between the mark YALE for flashlights and YALE
locks and keys, even though the products were not in competition. Judge
Learned Hand rejected the "same descriptive properties" wording of the
1905 Trademark Act and held that infringement and injury could occur
when using the mark on related, but noncompeting goods. 5 In recent cases
28. See McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979) ("an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply
confused, as to the source of the goods"); Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports, Ltd., 544
F.2d 1167, 1175 (2d Cir. 1976) (the trademark need not mislead all customers, instead it need
only be likely to mislead many customers).
29. See supra note 4.
30. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 24:6, at 183 ("goods are related, not because of
any inherent common quality of the respective goods, but related in the sense that buyers are
likely to believe that such goods, similarly marked, come from the same source, or are somehow
connected with or sponsored by a common company"); see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 159 (9th Cir.) (focused on whether the uses are related
so that they are likely to be connected in the mind of a prospective purchaser), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 830 (1963).
31. Factors to consider in determining whether the products are distributed in the same
channels of trade are the following: whether the respective products are sold in the same outlets
by the same methods; whether they reach the same class of purchasers; whether they are sold
in the same price range; and whether a buyer is likely to see them both sold in the same store.
2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6 § 24:6, at 185-86.
32. Id. at 186. In Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917),
cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1917), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Aunt Jemima mark on defendant's pancake syrup and plaintiff's pancake butter was likely
to cause confusion as to the source or origin of the products. As that time, a trademark
could be appropriated by one in any market for goods not in competition with those of the
registered owner of the mark. However, the Second Circuit found that the goods were "so
related as to fall within the mischief of equity." Id. at 409-10. The court also found that syrup
and flour were both food products commonly used together and that the public, seeing the
trademark on syrup would conclude that it was made by the plaintiff. Id. at 410.
33. 33 Stat. 724 (1905).
34. 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
35. Judge Hand stated in one of his most often quoted opinions:
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involving related but noncompeting goods, courts have applied a separate
related goods test to determine the likelihood of confusion. For example, in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polrad Electronics Corp.,3 6 the Second Circuit set forth
eight factors3 7 to consider in determining whether consumers are likely to be
confused by the use of similar marks on related goods. Other circuits have
applied a similar multi-factor test in cases involving noncompeting goods.3"
In AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats,39 the Ninth Circuit indicated that the relevant
factors in determining the likelihood of confusion include the following: 1)
the comparative strength or weakness of the marks; 2) the similarity in
appearance, sound, and meaning of the marks; 3) the class of goods in
question; 4) the marketing channels used; 5) the evidence of actual confusion;
and 6) the defendant's intent.
C. Appellate Review of the Likelihood of Confusion Issue
Although likelihood of confusion is the most important issue in trademark
infringement actions, the appropriate standard of review remains unclear.4
The circuits are inconsistent in their treatment of the likelihood of confu-
sion, 41 and the Supreme Court has provided very little guidance on this
His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it
changes his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's
reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his control. This is an injury, even
though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a
reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can
use it only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognized that, unless the
borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification
of the two, it is unlawful.
Id. at 974.
36. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
37. The variables include the strength of the plaintiff's mark; the degree of similarity
between the two marks; the proximity of the products; the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap; actual confusion; the defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark; the
quality of defendant's product; and the sophistication of the buyers. Id. at 495.
38. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983);
Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1982); Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160 (1lth Cir. 1982); Squirt Co. v. Seven-Up Co.,
628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225
(3rd Cir. 1978); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976).
39. 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. See supra note I1.
41. See 2 J. McCARrnY, supra note 6, § 23:22, at 113-14. The First, Fourth, Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits view the issue as a question of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous
standard. The Second and Seventh Circuits view the issue as a question of fact reviewable
under the clearly erroneous standard of review except when confusion depends on the similarity
of the marks in which case the issue is reviewable de novo. The Fifth Circuit views the issue
as a question of fact, however the clearly erroneous standard does not apply when the lower
court has applied an incorrect legal standard. The Third and Sixth Circuits view the issue as a
mixed question of fact and law with the inferences drawn from the basic facts not subject to
the clearly erroneous standard.
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matter. 42 Classification of an issue as one of fact or law is important because
it determines the appropriate standard for appellate courts to apply in
reviewing the trial court's determinations. 43 If likelihood of confusion is a
legal issue, then the appellate court can review de novo the lower court's
findings regarding that issue." On the other hand, if likelihood of confusion
is treated as an issue of fact, then the appellate court is bound by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and cannot reverse the lower court's deter-
mination unless it is found to be clearly erroneous.
4 5
The clearly erroneous standard can be difficult to satisfy. For example,
in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 46 the Supreme Court held
that "[a] finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."
47
Few circuits view the issue of likelihood of confusion as a question of
law, or one of mixed fact and law.4 Of the circuits that view the issue as
one of fact, three apply the clearly erroneous standard on a conditional
basis. For example, while the Fifth Circuit views likelihood of confusion as
an issue of fact, it recognizes governing legal standards that it must consider
in making its final determinations. 49 In Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packaging Corp.,30 the Fifth Circuit held that "when a district
42. In Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982), the Supreme Court
ruled that the clearly erroneous standard of review is the appropriate standard of review of the
lower court's findings in trademark infringement actions. However, the Court never discussed
the issue of likelihood of confusion. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. See also
Elby's Big Boy v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (White, J., dissenting), in
which Justice White, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, cited examples of conflicting court
of appeals decisions and stated that a hearing was necessary to resolve the question of whether
likelihood of confusion was reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard as a question of
fact or reviewable de novo as a legal conclusion.
43. See Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and The Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REV.
1020 (1967).
44. See 2 J. McCARThsy, supra note 6, § 23.22, at 109 (stating that many federal courts of
appeal have categorized the likelihood of confusion issue as one of law to enable the appellate
court to reverse an erroneous legal conclusion, rather than being bound by the "clearly
erroneous" rule for fact finding).
45. See, e.g., Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 467 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979) (trial court's
findings of fact in action brought to enjoin trademark infringement, including findings on the
question of actual confusion, are not subject to reversal unless clearly erroneous); Fleetwood
Co. v. Hazel Bishop, Inc., 352 F.2d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 1965) (scope of review of district court's
findings of fact in trademark and other actions is limited to determination of whether such
findings are clearly erroneous).
46. 333 U.S. 364 (1947).
47. Id. at 395.
48. See supra note 41.
49. See generally Comment, Appellate Review, supra note 8 (misapplication of one crucial
legal standard can lead to de novo review of all factors of the likelihood of confusion
analysis).
50. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
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court labors under a misapprehension of the governing legal norms, the
clearly erroneous standard no longer circumscribes appellate review." 5' How-
ever, in Sun Banks of Florida, Inc. v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation, 52 the Fifth Circuit stated that the comments in Kentucky Fried
Chicken concerning the appropriate standard of review in situations where
a district court "governs under a misapprehension of the governing legal
norms" was not to be taken as an erosion of the standard of review applicable
to a finding of likelihood of confusion. 3 Nevertheless, in Fuji Photo Film
v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha,5 4 the Fifth Circuit again held that the
clearly erroneous standard did not apply because the trial court grounded
its finding of likelihood of confusion primarily on the sophistication of
purchasers of defendant's product. The appellate court determined that the
trial court also erred in focusing on actual confusion as discounting likelihood
of confusion and in considering good faith as a defense to trademark
infringement.,,
Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have adhered to a conditional
application of the clearly erroneous standard of review.56 In Union Carbide
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc.,17 the Seventh Circuit held that likelihood of
confusion was a question of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous
standard. However, the court also found that to the extent that the deter-
mination is predicated upon the similarity of the marks, the appellate court
"is in as good a position as the trial judge" to determine the possibility of
confusion.5" In Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House Ltd.,19 the Second
51. Id. at 384. The case considered the question of whether the district court properly
included the fact that defendant used Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) trademarks on the supplies
it sold to KFC franchises. Defendant asserted its right to use the mark on its packaging supplies
even though it was not an approved source of KFC's products. The court held that the question
whether a particular digit (finding of fact) can be taken into account was a question of law.
Thus, the court reviewed the issue de novo, finding that the surviving digits still added up to
unfair competition. Similarly, in Chevron Chem, Co. v. Voluntary Purch. Groups, Inc., 659
F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that a de novo review of the factors of the
likelihood of confusion analysis was necessary because the district court erred in considering
the differences in specific details rather than the "overall" similarity of plaintiff's and defend-
ant's trade dress. Furthermore, the court found that the trial court erred in holding that the
absence of actual confusion demonstrated an absence of likelihood of confusion. Id. at 705.
52. 651 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 314. The court rejected appellant's offered distinction between "likelihood of
confusion as a question of fact in the appellate review crucible" and "factors of precedential
magnitude" that must be considered in determining whether confusion is likely.
54. 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985).
55. Id. at 595-97.
56. See Comment, Appellate Review, supra note 8.
57. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 383. In McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979),
the Second Circuit also asserted its right to consider de novo the lower court's determinations
regarding the similarity of the marks.
59. 689 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Circuit extended the similarity of the marks exception to include a de novo
review of the evidence of the different "settings" 6 in which the trademark
is advertised when such evidence is crucial to the similarity analysis.61
Prior to its decision in Blue Bell I, the Ninth Circuit treated the likelihood
of confusion issue as a mixed question of fact and law. 62 When the lower
court's determinations involved undisputed facts, the court applied a de novo
review to the issue of likelihood of confusion. Where the facts were in
dispute, however, the court applied a two-tier test applying the clearly
erroneous standard to the underlying "foundational" facts and giving a de
novo review to the "legal conclusion" of likelihood of confusion.6
3
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the appellate court's
obligation to adhere to the clearly erroneous standard in reviewing the trial
court's factual determinations. In Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laborato-
ries,64 a drug manufacturer brought suit after discovering that some phar-
macists dispensed generic substitutes for its product and distributed them in
bottles that were labeled with the manufacturer's trademark. The Court
focused on the issue of contributory trade dress infringement that arose from
the manufacture of "look alike capsules" and the distribution of catalogue
entries that revealed the similarities in price and color of the plaintiff's drugs
to defendant's generic product. Because there was sufficient evidence of
mislabeling6 to establish infringement, the Court never reached the issue of
likelihood of confusion. Nevertheless, the Court found that the appellate
court erred in reviewing the district court's findings of mislabeling de novo,
without holding that they were clearly erroneous. 66 The Court concluded
60. Id. at 1129-30. The court considered evidence concerning the way the tags containing
the trademarks were presented to the prospective purchasers.
61. The court stated that "an inquiry into the degree of similarity between two marks does
not end with a comparison of the marks themselves ... the 'setting in which a designation is used
affects its appearance and colors the impression conveyed by it.' " Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 729 comment (b), at 593 (1938)).
62. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
63. Id. at 346-47. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.,
Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982), see infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text, the Ninth Circuit has
eliminated the distinction between the disputed facts versus undisputed facts distinction and
applied the two level test in all cases. See, e.g., Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d
1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1984) (likelihood of confusion was conclusion of law based upon
a consideration of "foundation facts"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 955 (1985). Though the Ninth
Circuit continued to view the likelihood of confusion issue as a mixed question of fact and
law, in United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 824 (1984), the court determined that the issue was predominantly one of fact.
64. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
65. Id. at 854. The Court stated that "it is undisputed that those pharmacists who mislabeled
generic drugs with Ives registered trademark violated § 32."
66. The Supreme Court stated:
"By rejecting the District Court's findings simply because it would have given
more weight to evidence of mislabeling than did the trial court, the Court of Appeals
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that the Second Circuit's failure to abide by the clearly erroneous standard
of review was reversible error.67
II. THE BLuE BELL CASE
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc. (Blue Bell J),68 Levi Strauss sued
Blue Bell, alleging that Blue Bell infringed Levi's trademark rights in the
right rear pants pocket tab by using a similar tab on the right rear pocket
of its pants. The district court held that Levi's pants pocket tab had become
distinctive of the goods of Levi Strauss and that Blue Bell's use of the pocket
tab on the rear pocket of its pants was likely to cause confusion as to the
source of the Blue Bell pants. 69 Accordingly, the court enjoined Blue Bell
from using the mark on its pants. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 70 finding that
the evidence of secondary meaning was "strong" and that the Levi mark
was entitled to a "broad scope of protection." '7'
In Blue Bell II,72 Levi again brought suit in district court to enjoin Blue
Bell from using tabs similar to Levi's pants tab on the pocket of its shirts.
Levi motioned for partial summary judgment on the ground that Blue Bell
was barred by the doctrine of estoppel from litigating the issues that were
decided by the trial court in Blue Bell L.73 The district court found that Blue
Bell I and Blue Bell II involved different products, 74 different consumers, 75
and different markets. 76 Therefore, the court denied Levi's motion, and held
clearly erred. Determining the weight and credibility of the evidence is the. special
province of the trier of fact. Because the trial court's findings concerning the
significance of the instances of mislabeling were not clearly erroneous they should
have not been disturbed. An appellate court cannot substitute an interpretation of
the evidence for that of the trial court simply because the reviewing court might
give the facts another construction, resolve the ambiguities differently, and find a
more sinister cast to actions which the District Court apparently deemed innocent.
Id. at 856-58 (quoting United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 399 U.S. 485
(1980)).
67. 456 U.S. at 856.
68. 200 U.S.P.Q. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
69. Id. at 445.
70. 632 F.2d 817, 208 U.S.P.Q. 713 (9th Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 821, 208'U.S.P.Q. at 717.
72. 208 U.S.P.Q. 473 (N.D. Cal 1980).
73. Id. at 475-78. Levi Strauss sought to eliminate the following issues at trial: 1) the
functionality of the pocket tab trademark; 2) the decorative nature of the pocket tab; 3) the
fraud upon the Trademark Office; 4) the abandonment of the pocket tab; 5) the secondary
meaning of the pocket tab; 6) the likelihood of confusion; and 7) the effect of Blue Bell's use
of its own trademark.
74. Id. at 477-78 (jeans versus children's shirts).
75. Id. (wearers versus mothers of children).
76. Id. The court stated that with respect to the different markets the district court had
noted:
[I]nsofar as the jeans market is concerned, Levi Strauss and Blue Bell are the
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that the doctrine of estoppel was inapplicable. 77 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
with one judge dissenting. 78 However, the Ninth Circuit later withdrew the
case and ordered a rehearing en banc.7 9
In Blue Bell 1,80 the Ninth Circuit held that the clearly erroneous standard
of review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) was the appropriate
standard for reviewing the trial court's findings regarding likelihood of
confusion. 8 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination
that the trademark protection afforded Levi's pants pocket tab did not
extend to the shirt market. Since there was sufficient testimonial evidence at
the trial level to indicate that consumers treat pants and shirts differently,
the court concluded that the factual issues involved in Blue Bell II were
different from those litigated in Blue Bell L82 Therefore, the court's finding
in Blue Bell I that the Levi's pants pocket tab had acquired secondary
meaning did not have collateral estoppel effect upon a finding of secondary
meaning for the shirt tab.83
The majority determined that even absent evidence that pants and shirts
are treated differently, the trademark protection extended to the pants tab
would not necessarily inhere in the shirt tab since the pants tab was registered
as a "location specific" mark. 4 The majority further determined that there
was no need to undertake a separate related goods test to determine whether
confusion was likely to result from Blue Bell's use of the shirt tab. The
related goods test, the majority found, "served largely to define the scope
of secondary meaning,"" and the district court had already determined that
the shirt tab had not acquired secondary meaning. Accordingly, the majority
concluded that the district court's finding, that the absence of secondary
meaning in the shirt precluded a finding of likelihood of confusion, was not
clearly erroneous.8 6
two primary companies in the marketplace. However, insofar as shirts are concerned,
and particularly insofar as children's shirts are concerned, the market is far more
diverse and Blue Bell and Levi Strauss are merely two of a great many companies
competing for the market of the consumer dollar.
77. 208 U.S.P.Q. at 479. The court denied Levi's motion as to the issues of functionality,
decorativeness, abandonment, secondary meaning, likelihood of confusion, and the effect of
Blue Bell's use of its own trademark. With respect to the issue of fraud on the Trademark
Office, the court granted the motion as to the fraud in the maintenance issue and denied the
motion as to the fraud in the procurement issue.
78. 221 U.S.P.Q. 525 (9th Cir. 1984).
79. 734 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1984).
80. 778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
81. Id. at 1356. The court stated: "For the sake of accuracy, uniformity, and consistency
with the predominate view in other circuits, we will hereafter review findings of likelihood of
confusion under the clearly erroneous standard."
82. Id. at 1357.
83. Id. at 1356.
84. Id. at 1359.
85. Id. at 1359-60.
86. Id. at 1361.
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The dissent agreed with the majority that Blue Bell I did not have collateral
estoppel effect upon a finding of secondary meaning in the shirt tab.17
However, the dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the lack
of secondary meaning in the shirt tab precluded a finding of likelihood of
confusion. The dissent concluded that the district court erred by failing to
apply the related goods doctrine since it determined that pants and shirts
are clearly related goods."s
Like the majority, the dissent reasoned that the clearly erroneous standard
of review should apply to the trial court's determination of likelihood of
confusion. s9 However, under the dissent's view, the appropriate degree of
deference was conditioned upon whether the district court properly applied
the correct legal standard. 90 The dissent concluded that the district court's
failure to apply the related goods test to Levi's pants tab and Blue Bell's
shirt tab as well as to Levi's pants tab and Blue Bell's shirt tab were errors
of law. 9' Therefore, it determined that remand was necessary for further
factual determinations on the basis of the correct legal standard. 92
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
The majority's reasoning is inconsistent with previous decisions involving
the use of a protected trademark on related, noncompeting goods. Under
previous decisions, once a mark earned trademark protection, either through
inherent distinctiveness or by acquiring secondary meaning, courts applied a
related goods test to determine whether the strength of that mark warranted
protection against its use on noncompeting goods. Thus if the majority had
analyzed the facts in light of the Sleekcraft decision, 93 it would have focused
on the strength of the trademark in the pants market rather than on whether
the mark had acquired secondary meaning in the shirt market.
The majority provided three reasons for ruling on the issue of likelihood
of confusion without the aid of a multi-factor test. First, the majority
determined that the consumer perceptions of shirts and pants were "differ-
ent." ' 94 Second, the majority reasoned that a secondary meaning could not
inhere in the shirt tab because the Levi Strauss tab was registered as a
location specific mark. 95 Finally, the majority found that application of the
related goods test was unnecessary given the district court finding that the
mark had not acquired secondary meaning in the shirt market. 96 None of
87. Id. at 1364 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1362.
89. Id. at 1364.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1364-65.
92. Id. at 1365.
93. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
94. 778 F.2d at 1357.
95. Id. at 1356.
96. Id. at 1360.
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the court's rationales provide a clear legal basis for disregarding the related
goods test.
The fact that pants and shirts are "different" signifies only that they are
not directly competing goods. Yet in recent years courts have not limited
trademark protection to directly competing goods. Since the enactment of
the Lanham Trademark Act,97 courts have broadened the scope of protection
to any goods "with which the use of the mark is likely to cause confusion." 9
Consumer perception of pants and shirts as being different does not of itself
imply that a related goods test would be inappropriate. If the majority had
utilized the relatedness factors, it would have recognized that the Levi Strauss
and Blue Bell products are distributed in the "same channels of trade." 99
Moreover, they are sold in the same outlets by the same methods; reach the
same class of purchasers; are sold in the same price range; and are likely to
be sold in the same store. Even if Levi Strauss was seeking protection of its
trademark rights in the tab on garments generally, there is authority recog-
nizing that all items of wearing apparel are related.'°°
The majority rationalized the lower court's determination that there was
no likelihood of confusion by focusing on the expression "location specific."
Nevertheless, the court failed to adequately define location specific. 10 1 More-
over, the majority failed to support its conclusion that a location specific
mark deserved only limited protection. In Blue Bell I, the Ninth Circuit held
that evidence of secondary meaning in the tab was strong, and that the tab
was entitled to a broad scope of protection. 0 2 At the time of registration,
the evidence may have supported only secondary meaning in the tab as
applied to pants. However, this fact alone should not imply that the tab has
not acquired secondary meaning in other items of wearing apparel since the
time of registration. In Blue Bell I, the Ninth Circuit specifically left open
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946).
99. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., In re Duofold Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 638 (T.T.& A. Bd. 1974) (holding that
purchasers have come to expect many items within the clothing field sold under the same or a
similar mark to have a common origin); In re Sox Unlimited, 169 U.S.P.Q. 682, 683 (T.T.&
A. Bd. 1971) (holding that "identical or substantially identical marks applied to items of wearing
apparel, no matter how different they may be, are likely to cause confusion in trade as to
source").
101. The expression could mean that the mark was registered only in conjunction with pants.
However, the Lanham Act does not limit trademark protection to goods specified in the
certificate of registration. See supra note 4. The expression could also mean that, at the time
of registration, Strauss only provided evidence that supported proof of secondary meaning in
the pants. In Blue Bell I, however, the Ninth Circuit left open the question whether secondary
meaning inhered in any other item with which the tab had been sold. See 632 F.2d 817, 821
n.7, in which the Ninth Circuit stated: "The parties have argued toward general definitions of
Strauss's trademark rights under various hypothetical circumstances. Such definitions must
await presentation of an actual case or controversy involving established facts."
102. 632 F.2d 817, 821, 208 U.S.P.Q. 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1980).
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the question whether secondary meaning inhered in any other item on which
the tab had been sold.'0 3
The majority found that a separate related goods test was unnecessary
because the district court concluded that the shirt tab had not acquired
secondary meaning. Other courts, however, have not required proof of
secondary meaning in the defendant's market as the only method of estab-
lishing trademark protection. °4 Such proof would require evidence of ad-
vertising and promotion of the mark as applied to goods in the defendant's
market. 05 However, courts may find a trademark infringement even if the
owner never manufactured goods in the defendant's market.) ° The Lanham
Act provides protection against another's use of a mark on any goods with
which such use is likely to cause confusion. 07 Levi Strauss had already
proven in Blue Bell I that secondary meaning inhered in the pants tab and
that the pants tab was a validly registered mark. Traditionally, courts apply
a related goods test to determine whether consumers are likely to be confused
by the use of plaintiff's protected trademark on the defendant's goods.
The inconsistency of the majority's reasoning may be due to its recent
adoption of the clearly erroneous standard of review under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).' °8 In treating likelihood of confusion as a question of
fact, the reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court in determining
which factors to consider and how much weight each factor should be given.
103. Id.
104. But see Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff had not satisfied its burden of proving
secondary meaning in defendant's noncompeting market; even though the district court found
a likelihood of confusion from the use of plaintiff's mark on defendant's noncompeting goods).
The Scott Paper court found that the district court, in its application of the related goods analysis,
focused primarily upon likelihood of confusion rather than secondary meaning. The appellate
court held that likelihood of confusion was an "analytically distinct, albeit closely related
element of the case." Id. at 1229. However, in Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460
(3rd Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit held that the ten factor analysis was sufficient to determine
secondary meaning in cases where the trademark owner had not entered defendant's market.
The Court held that the district court erred in reading Scott Paper to hold that "likelihood of
confusion, standing alone, [was] not sufficient to trigger injunctive relief," and that a further
showing of secondary meaning was required. Id. at 464. The court concluded that the purpose
of the related goods analysis was "to determine secondary meaning in exactly those cases where
the trademark owner has not entered defendant's market." Id. at 465.
105. In determining whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning, courts generally
consider the length and manner of the use of the mark as well as the nature and extent of
advertising and promotion of the mark in conjunction with a particular producer's goods. See
supra note 26.
106. See Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 1228 (stating that under certain circumstances, "a
trademark can develop a secondary meaning as to goods or services to which the mark has
not been applied").
107. See supra note 4.
108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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For example, in Blue Bell II, the district court gave substantial weight to
evidence of actual confusion,1°9 one factor of the related goods test."0 Rather
than weigh each element of the multi-factor test separately, the district court
concluded that the absence of actual confusion implied no likelihood of
confusion. Yet, other courts have repeatedly held that no single factor of
the related goods test is determinative of likelihood of confusion." In
addition, the Ninth Circuit has often held that absence of actual confusion
does not demonstrate an absence of likelihood of confusion." 2
Even if likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, the Ninth Circuit's
deference to the trial court may have exceeded the deference required under
the "clearly erroneous" rule. The Supreme Court has stated that determi-
nations regarding the "weight and credibility of the evidence" under the
clearly erroneous standard is the "special province of the trier of fact."" 3
In Blue Bell II, however, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the district court
should determine which factors it will consider as well as the weight each
factor should be given." 4
The Ninth Circuit's strict application of the clearly erroneous standard
places what other circuits often label as the controlling "legal standards,"
which do not fall under Federal Rule 52(a), under the broad rubric of
"factual evidence" subject to the clearly erroneous rule. For example, the
dissent in Blue Bell II stated that likelihood of confusion determinations
were subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. However, it also
concluded that the district court's failure to apply the related goods test with
respect to the Levi's pants tab and Blue Bell's shirt tab were errors of law." 5
The dissent's position is consistent with the approach taken by other circuits
109. 778 F.2d at 1360. The court acknowledged that the district court focused primarily on
survey evidence and retailer testimony and that such evidence was relevant to the existence of
actual confusion.
110. Id. The court also recognized that actual confusion was "merely one element of the
multifactor test." Id.
11l. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polrad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 820 (1961); see also Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1980) (no
single factor is determinative of the ultimate legal issue).
112. J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 191 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975)
(fact that trial court found no evidence of actual confusion did not preclude conclusion
of likelihood of confusion, as actual confusion was merely one factor to be considered in
making final determination). See also Shakey's, Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir.
1983) (if evidence of actual confusion is inconclusive it should be accorded little weight).
113. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. at 856.
114. The Ninth Circuit refused to disturb the district court's conclusion regarding the
likelihood of confusion issue even though the conclusion was based solely on the evidence of
actual confusion rather than the eight factors of the related goods analysis. The appellate court
conceded that the absence of evidence of actual confusion need not give rise to an inference
of likelihood of confusion and that such evidence is but one facet of the related goods test.
Nevertheless, the appellate court regarded the reliance on actual confusion as the "prerogative
of the district court." 778 F.2d at 1360 n.10.
115. 778 F.2d at 1364.
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that view the issue of likelihood of confusion as a question of fact. 1 6 Under
the Supreme Court's statement of the clearly erroneous standard," 7 appellate
courts can give the appropriate deference to the trial court's factual findings
while recognizing certain factors of "precedential magnitude" in determining
whether confusion is likely.
Courts often rely on the Supreme Court's statement of the clearly erro-
neous standard to justify a reversal of the district court's factual findings
when there has been a misapplication of a governing legal standard. For
example, in Fuji Photo Film v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha,"8 the
Fifth Circuit held that the "clearly erroneous" rule did not apply to deter-
minations reached under an incorrect legal standard. 119 However, the court
found that the conclusion would be no different even if the appellate court
was bound by the clearly erroneous standard.120 The court held that a review
of the evidence on which the trial court grounded its finding left the court
"with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed." 12
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Dis-
count Drugs, 122 held that the clearly erroneous standard applied even though
the district court's analysis regarding the finding of likelihood of confusion
was incomplete. 2 Nevertheless, the court found that the district court erred
in laboring under a theory 24 that "limited the factors relevant to a finding
of likelihood of confusion."' 125 Since the district court failed to properly
apply the related goods test, the appellate court found that the district court's
116. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film, 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985) (Fifth Circuit held that
trial court had committed errors of law in focusing on actual confusion as discounting
likelihood of confusion and in considering good faith as defense to trademark infringement);
Safeway Stores Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160 (lth Cir. 1982) (Eleventh
Circuit held that district court erred in failing to apply the related goods test in determining
whether the name "Safeway" as applied to stores was likely to be confused with "Safeway"
as applied to discount drugs).
117. Ives Labs., 333 U.S. 64 (1948).
118. 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985).
119. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
120. 754 F.2d at 597.
121. Id.
122. 675 F.2d 1160 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 1163 n.3. The Eleventh Circuit recognized the Fifth Circuit as its governing body
of precedent. However, in Safeway Stores, the court relied on the statement made in Sun
Banks, 651 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1981), that the rationale in Kentucky Fried Chicken, 549
F.2d 368, 384 (5th Cir 1977), see text accompanying note 44, "should not be taken as an
erosion of the standard of review applicable to a finding of likelihood of confusion."
124. The district court relied on a statement made in John R. Thompson v. Holloway, 366
F.2d 108, 114 (5th Cir. 1966): "Where the unauthorized use of a conflicting mark is confined
to a distinct and geographically separate market, there may be no present likelihood of public
confusion."
125. 675 F.2d at 1164. The court stated that "the district court held that because Safeway had
no stores in Florida and no advertising penetration in the state, there was no- likelihood of
confusion." Id.
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determinations regarding likelihood of confusion were clearly erroneous. 126
By treating likelihood of confusion as a question of fact, the Ninth Circuit
effectively eliminated the distinction between secondary meaning and likeli-
hood of confusion. While the two issues may be interchangeable in competing
goods cases, courts rarely equate them with respect to noncompeting goods. 27
Traditionally, courts have relied on the related goods test to determine the
likelihood of confusion because secondary meaning was not enough to
determine the existence of confusion arising from the use of the mark on a
noncompeting good. 2 ' The court in Blue Bell II, however, found that the
related goods test serves merely to define the scope of secondary meaning
where the plaintiff has not entered defendant's market. 2 9 Therefore, since
Levi Strauss had entered the shirt market, the court could determine the
scope of trademark protection without the aid of a related goods test.
The Ninth Circuit's approach is inconsistent in that the strict application
of the clearly erroneous standard could result in a more limited standard
once the plaintiff has entered defendant's market. For example, in Blue Bell
II, the Levi Strauss tab had acquired strong secondary meaning in the pants
market. Additionally, the plaintiff advertised and promoted the tab in the
shirt market. Yet the majority's conclusion suggests that the trademark
protection is narrower once the plaintiff has expanded his product line into
the defendant's market. Under the court's reasoning, the strength of the
trademark on the principal goods is no longer relevant in determining the
amount of trademark protection afforded to that mark on the new product.
Accordingly, the plaintiff must reestablish recognition in his mark through
sales, advertising and promotion of the trademark in conjunction with the
new product. However, if plaintiff had not entered defendant's market at
all, he may have obtained protection against the use of his mark on defend-
ant's product by the mere fact that the goods are sufficiently related. In the
former case, the burden of establishing trademark protection is far greater.
Not only must the plaintiff spend great amounts of time and money adver-
126. Id.
127. But see Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 465 (3rd Cir. 1983) (Third Circuit
recognized a "formal" distinction between likelihood of confusion and secondary meaning but
held that "proof of one is proof of the other").
128. See, e.g., Perfect Fit Industries, Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800 (2d Cir.
1981) (Second Circuit implied that likelihood of confusion could exist without proof of secondary
meaning when noncompeting goods are involved). In Perfect Fit, the court stated: "Under New
York law Perfect Fit was not required to prove secondary meaning in order to obtain relief
from Acme's infringing trade dress ... Perfect Fit [has] made a sufficient showing of likelihood
of customer confusion to warrant the granting of injunctive relief." Id. at 803. See also Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleader, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979) (public's
belief that the mark owner sponsored or otherwise approved the uses of the trademark satisfies
the confusion requirement).
129. 778 F.2d at 1359.
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tising and promoting the trademark, but he must do so before a potential
infringer enters the market.' 30
IV. IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Blue Bell II could have a significant impact
on future trademark infringement actions concerning noncompeting goods.
The secondary meaning test is a more precise measure of determining the
appropriate scope of protection where the plaintiff has already extended its
product line into defendant's market. Evidence of secondary meaning shows
not only the extent of advertising and promotion, but also the effectiveness
of those promotion efforts in creating an association in the minds of the
consumers between the mark and the producer.
Though the Ninth Circuit's analysis reflects a departure from established
precedent, its conclusion is a reasonable one considering the unique factual
situation involved in Blue Bell I. The case presents a situation in which the
protection of a registrant's mark should not extend to noncompeting goods
merely because they are "related." The Levi Strauss tab in Blue Bell II was
not inherently distinctive. Therefore, Levi Strauss could only obtain trade-
mark protection by showing that the tab had acquired secondary meaning.
To show secondary meaning, Levi Strauss was required to establish only
that consumers associated the mark with a particular producer of pants.
Under the related goods analysis, Levi could receive protection in the mark
with respect to any related market even though consumers might not nec-
essarily associate the mark with Levi Strauss or any one producer.
The appropriate scope of trademark protection is further complicated by
the possibility that the strength of a mark may decrease over time. For
example, the use of labels and symbols attached to shirts and pants has
become a popular trade gimmick in recent years.' 3' Consequently, the strength
of the Levi Strauss tab, in the sense of its source indicating quality, has
probably diminished since its initial registration as a valid, protectable trade-
mark.'32 Thus, it might be preferable to allow a certain amount of confusion
130. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(relief only available if Scott Paper could prove that secondary meaning in "Scott" existed for
household cleaners before Scott's Liquid Gold began using its mark).
131. See, e.g., United States v. One Lot of Approximately Twenty Thousand Pairs of
Counterfeit Blue Jeans Bearing the Jordache Trademark, 601 F. Supp 476, 225 U.S.P.Q. 616
(W.D.N.C. 1985) (recognizing the "Jordache" trademark on jeans); Polo Fashions, Inc. v.
Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (recognizing the Polo Player
symbol on labels and embroidered on finished products as a registered trademark).
132. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983)
(the design on the side of Brooks shoes, resembling a "V" on its side, had not acquired
secondary meaning because the design was neither "unusual" nor "unique" in the field of
athletic shoes); see also Puma-Sportsshuhfabriken Rudolf/Kassler D.G. v. Roller Derby Skate
Co., 206 U.S.P.Q. 255 (T.T.& A. Bd. 1980), in which the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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with respect to the Levi Strauss label on shirts where the relevant market
has become saturated with similar labels and symbols functioning as trade-
marks. 133
Strict application of the clearly erroneous rule may be necessary to resolve
the continuing split among the circuits regarding the appropriate standard
of review of likelihood of confusion. The Fifth Circuit's conditional appli-
cation of the clearly erroneous standard suggests that the likelihood of
confusion remains an issue of law at least in part. The Second and Seventh
Circuit's de novo review of the district court's determination of the similarity
of the marks may also imply that, in some circumstances, the appellate court
is in a better position than the trial court to determine whether confusion is
likely. The Ninth Circuit's approach provides a bright line rule that, in all
cases, regardless of the form of the record, the appellate court views the
likelihood of confusion as a question of fact and will not disturb the lower
court's determinations unless they are clearly erroneous.
The related goods test is not as conducive to a factual analysis of the
likelihood of confusion issue. It is not clear whether certain factors, for
example, the comparative strength of the trademarks and similarity and
proximity of the products, may be supported by survey evidence or testi-
mony. 3 4 As long as the majority of the circuits continue to view likelihood
of confusion as a question of fact, courts should consider only "determi-
nations based on observations of witnesses, assessments of credibility and
nuances of testimony."' 35
refused registration of defendant's stripe design on the side of its shoe because of its confusing
similarity to Puma's stripe. The Appeal Board recognized that the Puma stripe had acquired
secondary meaning due to Puma's extensive advertising and promotion of the mark. Neverthe-
less, the Board expressed serious doubts about the capacity of such stripe design to function
as a trademark because of the common practice among manufacturers of athletic shoes to place
various stripes and bar designs on the sides of their shoes.
133. See In re Lucky Co., 209 U.S.P.Q. 422, 423 (T.T. & A. Bd. 1980), in which the Appeal
Board reversed a refusal of registration of a three parallel stripe design that resembled a
competing manufacturer's stripe design mark. The Board held that the common practice among
athletic shoe manufacturers of using various stripe designs on the sides of shoes leaves all other
manufacturers of athletic shoes engaging in such practice with marks that are "extremely weak"
and entitled to only a "very narrow and limited scope of protection." The Board concluded
that "competitors in this field could come closer to such weak marks without violating owner's
rights therein than would be the case with a stronger mark."
134. See Rubin, The Role of the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) in Reviewing Trial Court Determinations of Likelihood or No Likelihood of
Confusion, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 20, 35 (THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION) (1984).
Rubin states that "this may account for the Fifth Circuit's formulation that application of the
clearly erroneous standard to the facts may justify reversal, and the more widespread observation
that where the trial court bases its determination solely on a comparison of the marks, the
appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to make the determination."
135. Id. at 35-36. The overriding purpose of Rule 52(a) is that the determinations of a trier
of fact based on observation of witnesses, assessments of credibility, and nuances of testimony
should not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit adopted a novel approach to determine the scope of
trademark protection. The Ninth Circuit found in Blue Bell II that an
inherently nondistinctive mark, which had acquired secondary meaning with
respect to the registrant's principal goods, could not serve the same source
indicating function with respect to related, though noncompeting goods.
Rather than base its conclusion on the related goods analysis, the court
examined whether the mark had obtained secondary meaning in the defend-
ant's market. While the Ninth Circuit's analysis reflects a departure from
established precedent, its conclusion is reasonable considering the unique
factual situation involved in Blue Bell HI. To the extent that the result is due
to the Ninth Circuit's strict adherence to the clearly erroneous standard of
review, that result is not only reasonable but necessary. Considering the
variety of approaches adopted by the circuits, the appellate courts are in
need of a bright line rule under which to review the likelihood of confusion
issue. Moreover, because the majority of the circuits are willing to view
likelihood of confusion as a question of fact, the Blue Bell H court's approach
in considering only "factual" evidence is the most logical means of reaching
uniformity and consistency among the circuits.
Mary Anne Kinney
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